Market Structure and Industrial Performance: Measuring and Analyzing Vertical Coordination by Frank, Stuart D. & Henderson, Dennis R.
• ... -i. .. 
MARKET S1RUCIURE AND INDUS1RIAL PERFORMANCE: 
MEASURING AND ANALYZING VERTICAL COORDINATION 
1·1r:: C·'·i''' ;;·· ,~:: L .. '.''vEf~SiTY 
;: 1 ? U F Y F ~ E fd~·. 
COLUfv18US, OHIO 43210 
Stuart D. Frank 
and 
Dennis R. Henderson· 
July 1989 
ESO 1569 
Selected paper presented at the 1989 annual meeting of the American Agricultural 
Economics Association, Louisiana State University, July 30 - August 2, 1989. 
• Graduate Research Associate and professor, Department of Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210. 
. 
--,~ 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE; 
MEASURING AND ANALYZING VERTICAL COORDINATION 
Abstract 
The effects of market structure on industry performance are well documented. 
We examine vertical coordination as a structural variable, analyzing its impact on 
industrial performance. We develop a measure of vertical coordination incorporating 
input-output relationships and mechanisms which transfer administrative control. 
Empirically examining the food processing industries, our findings suggest that the 
industries with higher degrees of vertical coordination export less but achieve greater 
profits. 
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MARKET STRUCTURE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE: 
MEASURING AND ANALYZING VERTICAL COORDINATION 
The effects of industry structure on industrial performance measures are well 
developed in literature. However, recent concerns have arisen regarding the impacts of 
technological developments on the future structure and performance of agriculture. 
Here within, we examine vertical coordination as a market structure variable and relate 
it to technology as a cause and market performance as a consequence. 
Numerous studies have examined transactional inefficiencies brought about by 
such events as new technological innovations and the subsequent changes in vertical 
governance structures (e.g. spot markets, contracts, and integration). The net is a shift 
in coordination of production towards nonmarket institutions (Schrader). For instance, 
the percentage of total farm output produced under either contractual arrangements or 
vertically integrated firms increased from 25 percent in 1960 to 31 percent in 1980 
(Marion pg 15). Current advances, primarily in biological and information technologies, 
are expected to further affect the institutional means by which the food and fiber sector 
coordinates its vertically interdependent activities. 
Vertical coordination captures the market and nonmarket administrative structure 
of control between vertically interdependent firms. However, past research has not 
systematically examined vertical coordination as a market structural variable. 
In this paper we propose a measure of vertical coordination that incorporates the 
entire spectrum of vertical arrangements that transfer control. The resulting index of 
vertical coordination augments research efforts to examine the impacts of structure on 
industry performance. 
Vertical Governance Structures 
Traditional economic thought on vertical integration centered upon the ownership 
of assets in neighboring stages of production, allowing for complete control over the 
entire production process. However, control over adjoining stages of production need 
not be accomplished through direct ownership of assets. Increased attention has been 
given to the role of contractual and implicit arrangements in vertical relationships. 
Governance structures or contractual ties can range from virtually no control to those 
affording complete control. Indeed, Schrader suggests "the effective difference between 
contracting and integration is not a difference in coordination." 
In their classic study Mighell and Jones (pg 1) define vertical coordination as "the 
general term that includes all the ways of harmonizing the vertical stages of production 
and marketing. The market price system, vertical integration, contracting, and 
cooperation singly or in combination are some of the alternative means of coordination." 
They (pg 7) define an economic stage of production as "any operating process capable of 
producing a salable product or service under appropriate circumstances." Marion (pg 
60) further defines a stage as "any value-added process, whether a change in location, 
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time, or form of the commodity. It is any step that takes the commodity closer to final 
consumption." 
Both Coase and Williamson (1975, 1979) have examined the factors affecting the 
organization of production in a market-hierarchies framework. In this framework, the 
criterion for organizing production is the minimization of production and transaction 
costs (Williamson, 1979). Transaction costs are the costs associated with the exchange 
of goods or services. However, Williamson suggests that transaction costs are the 
primary force behind vertical coordination, stating "if transaction costs are negligible, the 
organization of economic activity is irrelevant." 
Structural and environmental factors which affect transaction costs include 
uncertainty, complexity and frequency of transactions, thin markets, and idiosyncratic 
investments. Changes in one or more of these factors may lead to problems of bounded 
rationality, opportunism, and information impactedness. The institutional means of 
vertical coordination are dependent upon the degree to which bounded rationality, 
opportunism, and/or information impactedness occur. 
Williamson (1979) discusses a theoretical scheme of governance structures to 
examine these problems by identifying three classes of contracts; classical, neoclassical, 
and relational. Classical contracting is contingent-claims, which entails consideration of 
all future contingencies regarding the supply of production. The nature of the 
agreement is generally formal (i.e. written) with the consequences of nonperformance 
known ex ante. In essence, classical contracts are based on a set of legal rules with 
formal documents and self-liquidating transactions. Neoclassical contracts generally 
involve longer-term arrangements that do not cover all future contingencies. Trilateral 
governance structures (i.e. arbitration) are usually established to maintain needed 
flexibility. Relational contracts entail "adjustment processes of a more thoroughly 
transaction-specific, ongoing administrative kind" than that of either classical or 
neoclassical contracts. Relational contracts consider the "entire relation as it has 
developed through time." 
In this scheme, increases in transaction complexity, frequency, and uncertainty, 
aceompanied by idiosyncratic investments, shift the governance structure from classical 
to neoclassical to bilateral and finally to unilateral (integration) relational contracts. 
Clearly, under this progression, one party acquires increasing administrative control. 
Williamson's governance contract structure provides theoretical insight into the 
structure of vertical coordination. In an empirical analysis of the food and fiber system, 
Mighell and Jones identified three general types of contracts: market specification, 
production management, and resource providing. These parallel Williamson's 
theoretical treatment of vertical coordination in terms of transferring administrative 
control. 
In market specification contracts the supplier transfers part of the risk and 
management functions to the contractor. The firm is certain of its market and the basis 
for computing the price for its production. Management is transferred to the contractor 
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only to the extent that the decision of what to produce along with when and where the 
product is to be marketed. 
Production management contracts are similar to market specification contracts 
but differ in that the contracto:- has an increased role in production management. 
Contractor management usually takes the form of cultural and resource specifications. 
This is important when the quality of production is of critical concern. This may occur 
with new firms or when a new technology is involved. 
Resource providing contracts are the closest to vertical integration. The 
contractor not only provides a market for the production, but also is a major provider of 
inputs into the production process. Under this form of coordination the contractor 
assumes additional risks of losing his investment inputs and therefore monitors 
production more closely. 
It is apparent that many factors influence the structure of vertical coordination 
and that there are several .governance (institutional) structures organizing production. 
However, not so apparent is the impact upon efficiency. In a vertical system, each stage 
is interconnected with adjoining stages and each stage is vital to the efficacy of the 
entire system. If any one stage is inefficient, the whole system is ultimately adversely 
affected, being less efficient and thus less competitive. 
The magnitude of vertical interdependence concomitant with the vertical 
coordination governance structure, not the degree of vertical integration, makes 
industries competitive (Eckard). Examining the auto industry's vertical structure, Eckard 
found that the Japanese rely on more contractual arrangements than in the U.S., which 
is more integrated. He concludes that this contractual vertical structure has improved 
the efficiency of Japanese industry. 
These governance structures, either spot market, contractual, or integration, are 
an important dimension in the vertical structure of an industry or sector. In essence, for 
an industry to be competitive, it must minimize its vertical up-stream and down-stream 
organizational (transaction) costs. To analyze these costs and thus, competitive 
performance, a measure of vertical coordination is needed. 
The recognition of these governance structures implies a broad range of vertical 
relationships or coordination. Variables which consider both the ownership and 
contractual relationships of vertically interdependent firms or industries will more 
accurately measure vertical coordination. A measure of vertical coordination should 
capture the direct (ownership) and indirect (contractual) relationships that reflect 
interdependency among firms and industries, along with the magnitudes of the vertical 
interdependencies in an input-output context. 
Empirical research has examined vertical coordination primarily in the context of 
vertical integration. Studies by Adelman, Laffer, and Tucker and Wilder used variations 
of the value-added to sales ratio to calculate an index of vertical integration. However, 
there are two significant drawbacks to this measure. First, the ratio is influenced by 
more than vertical interrelationships, primarily profitability. Second, the value of the 
ratio is dependent upon the position of the firm in the production process. Therefore, 
this ratio has limited empirical value in the comparison of different industries. 
A second measure of vertical integration examines the linkages between 
industries through production functions. Maddigan advances this alternative view which 
considers the interdependence between firm's or industries' outputs. In this context, the 
measure focuses on the linkages created by firms between industries across markets. 
These linkages can be captured by aggregate production functions and are expressed by 
physical input-output coefficients. 
A Measure of Vertical Coordination 
To empirically examine the linkages between vertically interdependent industries, 
it is first necessary to develop a measure of vertical coordination (VC). Such a measure 
must satisfy two criteria; it must have a foundation in economic theory and be 
measurable (Adelman). A starting point for measuring Vertical Coordination (VC) is 
Maddigan's Vertical Industry Connection (VIC) index. 
This index exploits the interactions of the Leontief input-output model. Briefly, 
the Leontief model is based upon the firm. It is assumed each firm maximizes profits 
subject to its production function and final demand for its output. With the necessary 
and sufficient conditions satisfied, an optimal solution vector of inputs for each firm is 
determined. The optimal level of output for each firm is then obtained by substituting 
the solution vector of inputs into the firm's production function. The whole system of 
firms attains equilibrium when the value of the outputs supplied by each industry equals 
the demand for inputs by each industry and by final consumers. 
It is assumed each firm is characterized by a linear expansion path independent 
of the scale of operations. A less severe assumption is that firms have linear expansion 
paths over the relevant range of production. Therefore, the model describing the 
relative level of interaction between industries can be expressed in an input-output 
matrix by the consistent aggregation over products and firms. In the Leontief 
framework, each xij in the input-output transactions matrix X is the optimal value of 
industry i's output used as an input by industry j. 
To examine the vertical relationship between interdependent industries, the input-
output transactions matrix is constructed for the relevant economic sector(s). The S.I.C. 
(Standard Industrial Classification) scheme may be used to classify or group firms into 
industries. For example, four digit S.I.C. industries, including those within the production 
agriculture sector (S.I.C. 0111 to 0291) and the food and fiber manufacturing sector 
(S.I.C. 2011 to 2099) could be used to examine linkages between farms and down-
stream food processors and manufacturers. 
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The input-output transactions matrix is manipulated to form the foundation of the 
VC index. Two matrices, A and B, are created. In matrix notation: 
and 
B = [x;; / (z; - x;;)] - [yia - I 
where; 
I = identity matrix, r x r, 
X;; = the value of the i'h industry's output used as an input to the 
•rh • d • • 1 J m ustry; i, J = , .. .,r, 
z; = total value of the output of industry j; j = 1,. . .,r, 
Y;; = [Xu / (z; - X;;)] if i = j; 0 if i -f j; i, j = l,. .. ,r. 
Each element of matrix A, a;;, shows the percentage of the value of industry j's 
net output contributed by industry i. Each element of B, b;;. shows the percentage of the 
value of industry i's output used as an input to industry j. In short, matrix A is the up-
stream industry connections and matrix B is the down-stream industry connections. 
Inputs are negative as values used in production and outputs are positive. 
· In order to calculate VC at the food industry level, two matrices are defined for 
each food and fiber industry (four digit S.I.C., ie. 2011 to 2099). Each industry will be 
characterized by matrices CK and D"' where industry k has an input relationship with 
industry i and an output relationship with industry j. The division of industry k with its 
interdependent industries is determined by the flow of net production. These matrices 
are constructed using the rows and columns of matrices A and B, specifically, the 
columns of A and the rows of B. Matrices CK and DK are; 
and 
where; 
s(i) = one of the industries with which industry k is associated, 
indexed by i; i = 1 ... n (n ~ r), 
cii = the percentage of the value of industry s(j)'s net output 
contributed by industry s(i), 
dij = the percentage of the value of industry s(i)'s net output used as 
an input to industry s(j). 
To complete the measure of vertical coordination, a spectrum of vertical control 
ranging from no control to absolute control must be incorporated. to do this we 
propose segmenting differing types of contracts into a systematic cardinal measure of 
coordination. This is a subjective approach because data are not' available which 
quantify the transfer of administrative control. 
Instead of a continuous line of vertical control, a discrete line of five partitions is 
used to represent the spectrum of administrative control (see Figure 1). From the left 
moving right the line measures increasing degrees of administrative control by the 
contractor or integrator. The initial point represents open market transactions (spot 
market) then progresses, using Mighell and Jones' terminology, to market specification 
contracts, production management contracts, resource providing contracts, and finally 
ownership (integration). The cardinal measure assigned to each partition, representing 
increasing administrative control (moving from spot markets toward ownership), is then 
inserted into the functional formulation for a measure of Vertical Coordination. 
Type of 
Contract: 
spot 
market 
specifi-
cation 
production 
management 
resource 
providing 
ownership 
1------------------1-----------------1-----------------1-----------------1 
Cardinal 
Value: 0.0 0.25 0.5 0.75 
Figure 1. Cardinal Measurement of Vertical Coordination. 
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To capture contractual interactions, matrices EK and FK are created. Each ei; 
represents the measure of administrative control· for industry k with the up-stream 
industry i. Similarly, fii represents industry k's administrative control with down-stream 
industry j. The values for matrices E and F are equal to the sum of the products· of the 
percent of each transaction type and its cardinal value between industry i and j. The 
values for eij and fij may be expressed as; 
where; 
n 5 
eiJ and fi; = l: l: C1M&11 T"' 
g=l h=l 
M = cardinal value of transaction type (see Figure 1), 
T = percent of production coordinated by each transaction type, 
C = commodity C's percentage of industry i's output, 
g = number of commodities produced in each industry, 
h = type of contract (see Figure 1). 
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With matrices C, D, E, and F constructed, the variable VC may be calculated. 
Using matrix notation, the VC for industry k is defined as, 
where; 
i=n 
v4 = ~ - [1 / 1T <cY<C)(D;)(DY<Er<Ei)(F;)(F;f1 
i= 1 
T = transpose, 
n = the number of industries in which industry k operates, 
C = column i of industry k's input matrix, 
Di = row i of industry k's output matrix, 
Ei = column i of industry k's administrative control matrix, 
F1 = row i of industry k's administrative control matrix. 
The functional form of VC has several desirable properties: 
1. VC increases (decreases) when an input industry becomes relatively more 
(less) important by accounting for a larger (smaller) percentage of the total 
value of output of another industry. 
2. VC increases (decreases) when relatively more (less) of the output of an 
industry is used as an input to another industry. 
3. VC increases (decreases) as an industry increases (decreases) its number of 
vertical interactions with other industries. 
4. VC increases (decreases) as an industry exercises increased (decreased) 
administrative control. 
5. The range of VC is between 0 and 1. Thus, VC can be treated as an index 
number. 
Results 
To empirically examine the vertical coordination linkages between the food 
manufacturing industries and farm output sectors, we specified progressively 
comprehensive forms of the vertical coordination index. The first, A VC, measures the 
food industries' degree of up-stream administrative control. The second measure, VCl, 
captures up-stream linkages. The third, VC2, measures up-stream linkages plus the 
degree of vertical administrative control. The fourth measure, VC3, incorporates the 
components in VC2 plus the industry's down-stream linkages. Due to limited data 
availability, the degree of down-stream administrative control was not incorporated into 
the calculation of the vertical coordination indices. 
The value of information contained in different measures of vertical coordination 
is illustrated in Figure 2. It is clear that the degree of vertical coordination increases as 
the amount of information captured by each index increases (moving from VCI to VC3). 
For example, in the sugar, poultry, and fruit and vegetable industries, the importance of 
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the use of governance contracts in coordinating production is apparent by examining the 
differences between VCl and VC2, Figure 2. To illustrate, the average value of VCl 
for the fruit and vegetable processing industries is 0.04 (Table 1). The industry's degree 
of vertical coordination as measured by VC2, which captures the importance of different 
contracts, averaged 0.78. It is then evident that the use of governance contracts as a 
means of coordinating production is critically important in the fruit and vegetable 
processing industry. Incorporating these different components (up and down stream 
connections and administrative control) in a progressive manner illustrates the 
importance of each and the robustness of the composite index (VC3) in measuring the 
level of vertical coordination in the food manufacturing industries. 
To examine the effects of vertical coordination as a structural variable on the 
food manufacturing industries level of performance, several equations following the 
general form of equation 1 were analyzed, 
(+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) 
1. export propensity = (VC, CR4, RD, KS, AS, PWHE, GDI) 
with the expected signs above each variable. Variable descriptions and data sources are 
presented in Table 2. 
It is hypothesized that vertical coordination, a structural variable, is positively 
related with export propensity, a measure of industry performance. As formulated, the 
vertical coordination index captures the amount of administrative control one industry 
exercises over another. With increasing industry vertical coordination, the industry's 
vertical production relationships are increasingly more efficient, allowing the industry to 
be more competitive. The remaining independent variables are all conventional 
measures used in market - structure - performance models. The concentration ratio, 
CR4, for each industry is a measure of market power. The two variables, RD and 
PWHE, are examined to account for the "technology" and "skill" factors. To account for 
possible trade barriers, the variables KS and AS are specified. The ratio of capital to 
shipments is a measure of financial barrier and the advertising-sales ratio is a proxy for 
the industry's product differentiation. Finally, a measure of the "tradability" of industry 
production is measured by the variable GDI. 
In general, the regression results (Table 3) do not support the a priori effects of 
vertical coordination on export propensity. Specifically, three of the four vertical 
coordination variables, A VC, VC2, and VC3 are negatively and significantly related to 
the food industries' export propensity. The coefficients for RD, AS, and PWHE are also 
of opposite sign. Only the CR4, KS, and GDI variables are of expected sign. These 
findings suggesr-the food processing industries are applying the gains of increased 
efficiency from higher vertical coordination and skill levels to positively influence other 
measures of performance. 
One possible consequence of greater vertical coordination is that efficiency gains 
therefrom have been captured as economic rents rather than used to expand sales into 
... 
Table 1. Food Processing Industry Value of 
Vertical Coordination 
DESCRIPTION Ave• vc1b VC2.: VC3d 
Meat packing plants 0.043 0.492 0.514 0.523 
Sausages and other prepared meats 0.016 0.335 0.345 0.356 
Poultry dressing plants 0.335 0.280 0.521 0.522 
Poultry and egg processing 0.558 0.373 0.723 0.728 
Creamery buttery 0.159 0.610 0.671 0.706 
Cheese, natural and processed 0.159 0.495 0.575 0.575 
Condensed and evaporated milk 0.121 0.367 0.444 0.519 
Jee cream and frozen desserts 0.990 0.631 0.996 0.996 
Fluid milk 0.083 0.367 0.419 0.427 
Canned specialties 0.987 0.271 0.990 0.990 
Canned fruits and vegetables 0.860 0.057 0.868 0.868 
Dehydrated fruits, vegetables, and soups 0.793 0.017 0.796 0.798 
Pickles, sauces, and salad dressings 0.914 0.160 0.928 0.930 
Frozen fruits and vegetables 0.693 0.024 0.700 0.700 
Frozen specialties 0.999 0.610 1.000 1.000 
Blended/prepared flour & other mill prods 0.846 0.113 0.116 0.227 
Cereal breakfast foods 0.539 0.368 0.709 0.709 
Rice milling 0.001 0.163 0.164 0.169 
Wet corn milling 0.000 0.124 0.125 0.357 
Dog, cat, and other pet food 0.012 0.250 0.259 0.263 
Prepared feeds, n.e.c. 0.013 0.399 0.407 0.665 
Bread, cake, and related products 0.665 0.033 0.676 0.676 
Cookies and crackers 0.000 0.093 0.093 0.093 
Raw & refined cane sugar and beet sugar 0.303 0.128 0.393 0.663 
Confectionery products 0.484 0.054 0.512 0.512 
Chocolate and cocoa products 0.000 0.012 0.012 0.026 
Cottonseed oil mills 0.004 0.145 0.148 0.148 
Soybean oil mills 0.001 0.413 0.414 0.648 
Vegetable oil mills, n.e.c. 0.001 0.384 0.384 0.562 
Animal and marine fats and oils 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.157 
Shortening and cooking oils 0.000 o. 110 0.110 0.138 
Malt beverages 0.003 0.257 0.260 0.260 
Malt 0.000 0.251 0.252 0.596 
Wines, brandy, and brandy spirits 0.373 0.031 0.392 0.392 
Distilled liquor, except brandy o.ooo 0.000 0.001 0.001 
· Bottled and canned soft drinks 0.000 0.033 0.033 0.033 
Flavoring extracts and syrups, n.e.c. 0.000 0.033 0.033 0.145 
Canned and cured seafoods 0.000 0.039 0.039 0.039 
Fresh or frozen packaged fish 0.000 0.032 0.032 0.032 
Roasted coffee o.ooo 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Macaroni and spaghetti 0.870 0.408 0.923 0.923 
Food preparations, n.e.c. 0.807 0.468 0.897 0.899 
Mean 0.301 0.225 0.426 0.476 
Standard Deviation 0.371 0.193 0.328 0.318 
a = vertical coordination, the up-stream adminstrative control 
b = vertical coordination, up-stream connections 
c =vertical coordination, up-stream linkages plus administrative control 
d = vetical coordination, up and down-stream linkages plus administrative 
control 
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Table 2. Description of variables and data sources. 
Variable 
Export 
Propensity 
Profit Rate 
AVC 
VCl 
VC2 
VC3 
CR4 
RD 
KS 
AS 
MGMT 
PWHE 
GDI 
Description 
The value of U.S. exports minus U.S. imports as a share of domestic 
value of industry shipments. Calculated from Census of Manufactures. 
A proxy for industry profits was calculated as industry value added 
minus the total payroll divided by the gross book value of depreciable 
assets. Calculated from the Census of Manufactures. 
Vertical coordination, the up-stream administrative control. 
Vertical coordination using industry up-stream connections. 
Calculated from national input-output transactions matrix provided by 
Greg Alward. 
Vertical coordination using up-stream connections and administrative 
control. 
Vertical coordination using up-stream, down-stream connections, and 
administrative control. 
The four-firm concentration ratio, Census of Manufactures. 
The value of used research and development, private goods. Source; 
F. M. Scherer. 
The gross book value of depreciable assets to shipments ratio. 
Calculated from the Census of Manufactures. .• 
The value of advertising expenditures in the six measured media, from 
Leading National Advertising plus the value of industry advertising 
expenditures divided by industry shipments. Source; Richard Rogers. 
A proxy for management was calculated as the industry total payroll 
minus production worker payroll divided by the total payroll. 
Calculated from the Census of Manufactures. 
The average hourly wage for production workers. Census of 
Manufactures. 
The geographic dispersion index to measure the tradability of 
production. See Collins and Preston. 
11 
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'!'able 3. Determinants of u.s. Export Propensity, 1982 
Dependent Variable = Export Propensity 
Equation Regression Coefficients (t·values in parentheses) 
AVC VC1 
-o.14bb 
(2.17) 
2 ·0.19 
(1.47) 
3 
4 
VC2 VC3 CR4 RD 
0.0029b -0.003 
(1.75) 
0.0021 
(1.05) 
·0.21cc 0.0022 
(2.848) (1.29) 
-o.22bbo.0025• 
(2.93) (1.47) 
(1.57) 
KS AS PWHE 
0.12 -0.03• 
(0.8) (2.03) 
·0.0023 ·0.24 
(1.33) (1.51) 
·0.00078 ·0.035b 
(0.47) (2.39) 
·0.0016 ·0.02~ 
(1.06) (2.07) 
GDI Constant R2 
0.27bb 0.41 
(2.78) 
o.o9r- 0.19 .. 0.31 
(1.47) (1.89) 
0.094 .. 0.31co 0.46 
(1.61) (2.98) 
o.o9r-- 0.28" 0.47 
(1.67) (2.86) 
Note: a, b, and care significant at the .90, .95, and .99 level for a one-tailed test respectively. 
aa, bb, and cc are significant at the .90, .95 and .99 level for a two-tailed test respectively. 
Table 4. Determinants of Food Industry Profits, 1982 
Dependent Variable = Prof it Rates 
Equation Regression Coefficients Ct-values in parent'1eses) 
AVC VC1 VC2 VC3 CR4 KS AS MGMT PWHE Constant R2 F 
1.02b 0.032° ·6.5cc 1.35 0.22b ·1.07 0.58 10.12 
(2.49) (3.00) (5.69) (0.94) (2. 16) ( 1.32) 
2 ·0.78 0.027b -6.63°0 0.68 0.2b -0.024 0.52 7.88 
(0.89) (2.33) (5.23) (0.44) ( 1.85) co. 028) 
3 0.55 0.029b ·5.97°c 0.012• 1.14 0.14• -0.5 0.56 7.43 
(1.12) (2.50) (4.90) (1.50) (0.75) (1.32) (0.54) 
4 0.53 0.028b -6.04" 0.014• 1.09 0.14 ·0.41 0.56 7.38 
(1.05) (2.46) (4.93) (1.66) (0. 71) (1.26) (0.46) 
Note: a, b, and care significant at the .90, .95, and .99 level for a one-tailed test respectively. 
ea, bb, and cc are significant at the .90, .95 and .99 level for a two-tailed test respectively. 
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foreign markets. To examine this, several equations following the general form of 
equation 2 were analyzed; 
{+) (+) (+) {+) (+) (+) 
2. profit rates = f(VC, CR4, KS, AS, MGMT, PWHE) 
where the expected signs are above each variable and the description and data sources 
for each are identified in Table 2. 
Industrial organization literature is rich with the impacts of market structure on 
industry profits. It is hypothesized that vertical coordination is positively related to 
profits. This arises because of the gains in production efficiencies. Based upon 
numerous studies by others, the variables CR4, KS, and AS are expected to be positively 
related to profits through increased market power and potential barriers to entry. Once 
again, the "skill" factor captured in the variables MGMT and PWHE are expected to 
positively affect industry profits. 
The regression results for the profit equations (Table 4) generally support the 
hypothesized impacts. Specifically, the coefficients for the vertical coordination variables 
are quite enlightening. The coefficient for VCl, which captures the up-stream linkages, 
is negative, but not significant. However, the signs for VC2 and VC3 are positive, 
although not significant. This suggests that the component, up-stream governance 
contracts, which is captured in VC2 and VC3, but not in VCl, is a key factor influencing 
industrial performance and conduct. Indeed, this may be concluded. In equation 1, 
Table 4, the coefficient for A VC, up-stream administrative control, is significantly . 
positive with food industry profit rates. Therefore, it appears that the food processing 
industries, through the increased use of governance contracts, is taking efficiency gains in 
terms of domestic profits rather than a higher level of exports. 
Summary and Implications 
Structural characteristics have long been recognized as influencing industry 
competitive performance. Recently, growing concerns have centered upon the impacts 
of technological innovations on the structure and performance of the food and fiber 
sector. Studies have examined sources of market inefficiencies affecting industrial 
organization and performance. However, to the extent that vertical control was 
evaluated, those studies focused on vertical integration rather than the entire spectrum 
of governance structures used for vertical coordination. 
In this paper we propose a measure of vertical coordination that incorporates 
governance structures used to coordinate the organization of production and vertical 
input-output interdependencies. The synthesis of the entire spectrum of vertical 
governance structures and input-output interdependencies into a single value provides an 
improved or more accurate representation of industrial vertical coordination. 
~ . 
... 
• 
Using this methodology, we quantified the effects of vertical coordination on two 
dimensions of market performance in the food and fiber sector. Specifically, hypotheses 
were tested concerning the relationship between vertical coordination, export propensity, 
and profit rates. Our initial findings suggest the food processing industries, through 
increased use of governance contracts, applied the gained efficiencies to profit taking 
rather than enhancing export market shares. 
Limitations 
Although the functional form for vertical coordination encompasses the entire 
governance structure, its accuracy in measuring vertical coordination begs research in 
two areas. First, the value of transactions conducted under the various governance 
structures between interdependent sectors must be determined. Secondly, the degree of 
administrative control transferred under various forms of governance structures must be 
quantified. 
Presently, sufficient data on the types of contracts utilized and the percentage of 
transactions conducted under each is available only in limited degrees for most 
agricultural subsectors. Each type of governance structure transfers some degree of 
administrative control from one stage to another. More complete and detailed 
information on the types of transactions and the vawe of output exchanged will improve 
the preciseness of the vertical coordination measure and thus improve its ability to 
explain differences in performance. 
Finally, more needs to be learned regarding the extent to which managerial 
functions are transferred under various circumstances and contract formats. Quantifying 
the value of managerial functions and to what degree each is transferred can remove the 
subjectivity introduced in this study by assigning arbitrary cardinal values to 
administrative control. With such improved data, more definitive analysis of vertical 
coordination as a market structure variable will be possible. 
. . 
•, 
... 
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